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Abstract—Dual-functional radar communication (DFRC) sys-
tem has recently attracted significant academic attentions as an
enabling solution for realizing radar-communication spectrum
sharing. During the DFRC transmission, however, the critical
information could be leaked to the targets, which might be
potential eavesdroppers. Therefore, the physical layer security
has to be taken into consideration. In this paper, fractional
programming (FP) problems are formulated to minimize the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at targets under
the constraints for the SINR of legitimate users. By doing so,
the secrecy rate of communication can be guaranteed. We first
assume that communication CSI and the angle of the target are
precisely known. After that, problem is extended to the cases
with uncertainty in the target’s location, which indicates that
the target might appear in a certain angular interval. Finally,
numerical results have been provided to validate the effectiveness
of the proposed method showing that it is viable to guarantee
both radar and secrecy communication performances by using
the techniques we propose.
Index Terms—DFRC system, physical layer security, FP prob-
lem, secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of the wireless communication in-
dustry, the requirement for extra spectrum resources is on the
rise, which motivates the network providers and the policy
regulators to seek the chance for reusing frequency bands
that are currently under-utilized by the radar systems [1].
To this end, the research of radar-communication coexistence
(RCC) has recently attracted considerable attention from both
academia and industry [2], [3]. While various techniques have
been proposed for realizing RCC, one crucial drawback is
that most of these approaches require frequent cooperation
between radar and communication systems, which might be
difficult to be implemented in practice. Therefore, a more
promising methodology would be to share both the spectrum
and the hardware platform between these two functionalities,
which requires no additional coordinations, and has motivated
the study of the dual-functional radar-communication (DFRC)
system [4]. In [5], the authors proposed to embed commu-
nication symbols into the sidelobes of the radar transmit
beampattern, with the mainlobe being employed for target
detection, which allows information delivery to single or
multiple communication directions outside the mainlobe of the
radar. To enable the DFRC transmission for non-line-of-sight
(NLoS) communication channels, a joint beamforming design
has been presented by [6] for simultaneous target detection
and multi-user communications, which aims at approaching
a desired radar beampattern while guaranteeing the quality-
of-service (QoS) of the downlink communication users. As
a step further, several novel waveform designs have been
proposed in [6] with the purpose of minimizing the multi-
user interference (MUI) for downlink communications under
radar-specific constraints.
It is noteworthy that in the DFRC scenarios, the targets
to be detected might be potential eavesdroppers. This is
most likely to appear in defense-related applications, where
radar targets are usually adversary’s combat platforms. In
that case, it is highly possible that the critical information
will be leaked to the radar targets by the emission of the
DFRC waveform. Given the fact above, physical layer security
(PHY-security) must be considered in DFRC designs [7], [8].
Particularly, it has been widely understood that the communi-
cation secrecy could be enhanced by exploiting the artificial
noise (AN). For instance, in [9], the directional modulation
method was adopted together with the AN to improve the
communication performance within the direction of interest
while degrading that of other directions. In [10], the authors
studied the AN-aided secrecy rate maximum problem with no
structural restrictions on the AN in multiple-input multiple-
output (MISO) channel. Furthermore, in [11], AN based linear
precoding designs have been proposed to ensure the secrecy
performance in the system of massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO). Aiming to guarantee the QoS of the downlink
users while confusing the eavesdropper, AN has been exploited
in [12] for transmit beamforming design. Nevertheless, to the
best of our knowledge, little research efforts have been taken
towards the direction of enhancing the PHY-security of the
DFRC system.
In this paper, we study the transmission security for the
DFRC system, where the downlink cellular users are regarded
as legitimate receivers, with the radar targets being regarded as
potential eavesdroppers. Optimization problems are designed
to guarantee the communication secrecy by minimizing the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the target with
the help of AN. In the meantime, the communication secrecy
rate for the legitimate users is guaranteed by imposing SINR
thresholds. By employing the assumption of perfect communi-
cation CSI, the proposed optimization problems are designed
under precise and uncertain knowledge about the location of
the target, respectively, following with the complexity analysis
of each algorithm. Finally, numerical results are provided
by Monte-Carlo simulations, which show that the proposed
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Fig. 1. Dual-functional Radar-Communication system detecting targets which
work as potential eavesdroppers.
method is capable of guaranteeing the secrecy performance
while formulating a desired spatial beampattern towards the
target.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a dual-functional MIMO RadCom system as
shown in Fig.1. The BS is equipped with an N -antenna uni-
form linear array (ULA). It serves K downlink single-antenna
legitimate users while detecting targets at the same time. The
targets are considered as potential eavesdroppers which may
eavesdrop the information from the BS to legitimate users. For
simplicity, we assume that there is a single target of interest
in our system.
By exploiting the artificial noise in the beamforming design
, the transmit matrix X can be expressed as
X = WS+N (1)
where S = [s1, · · · , sL] ∈ CK×L is the desired signal from
BS; W = [w1,w2, ...,wK ]
T ∈ CN×K is the beamforming
matrix; N ∈ CN×L is an artificial noise matrix generated
artificially for avoiding leaking information to targets. Without
the loss of generality, we assume E
[
sls
H
l
]
= I, where sl is
the desired signal vector in the l-th time sloteq3. It is assumed
that ni ∼ CN (0,RN) , ∀i, where ni is i-th vector of N. RN
is the covariance matrix of the artificial noise. It follows that
the covariance matrix of transmitted waveform can be written
as
RX =
1
L
XXH =
K∑
i=1
Wi +RN . (2)
where Wi , wiw
H
i . E {·} denotes the statistical expectation
and (·)H represents the Hermitian transpose.
The received symbol at legitimate users is given as
Y = HX+ Z (3)
where H ∈ CK×N is the channel matrix; X ∈ CN×L is the
transmitted signal matrix, with L being the length of the radar
pulse/communication frame, Z ∈ CK×L is the noise matrix,
with zi ∼ CN
(
0, σ2IN
)
, ∀i.
To evaluate the performance of the system, several perfor-
mance metrics are employed in this paper. Firstly, the SINR
of the i-th legitimate user is
SINRi =
E
[∣∣hHi wisi
∣∣2]
∑K
k 6=i,k=1 E
[∣∣hHi wksk
∣∣2]+ ∣∣hHi Ni
∣∣2 + σ2
=
tr
(
hTi Wih
∗
i
)
∑K
k 6=i,k=1 tr
(
hTi Wkh
∗
i
)
+ tr
(
hTi RNh
∗
i
)
+ σ2
,
(4)
Accordingly, the SINR at the target is given as
SINRE =
|α|2aH (θ)∑Ki=1Wia (θ)
|α|2aH (θ)RNa (θ) + σ2
, (5)
where θ represents the azimuth angle of the target, a (θ) =[
1 ej2pi∆sin(θ) · · · ej2pi(N−1)∆ sin(θ)]T ∈ CN×1 denotes
the steering vector of the transmit antenna array; ∆ is the
antenna spacing between adjacent antennas being normalized
by the signal wavelength. Following [13], the achievable
secrecy rate can be defined as
SR =
1
2
[RC −RE ]+, (6)
where RC = min
i
log2 (1 + SINRi), RE = log2 (1 + SINRE),
[·] + denotes max {·, 0}.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Minimizing SINRE With Perfect CSI and Precise Target
Location
In this subsection, we aim to ensure secrecy rate by mini-
mizing the SINR at target and guarantee the SINR at legitimate
user maintaining above a certain threshold. Note that before
designing the beamforming matrix and the artificial noise, an
ideal radar beampattern should be obtained as the benchmark,
which can be given by solving the following constrained least-
squares (LS) problem [14]
min
η,Rd
M∑
m=1
∣∣ηPd (θm)− aH (θm)Rda (θm)
∣∣2
s.t. tr (Rd) = P0,
Rd  0,Rd = RHd ,
η > 0,
(7)
where η is a scaling factor; P0 is the transmission power
budget, {θm}Mm=1 denotes an angular grid covering the de-
tection angle range in [−π/2, π/2], a (θm) denotes steering
vector, Pd (θm) is the desired ideal beampattern gain at θm,
Rd represents the desired waveform covariance matrix. Given
Rd, our problem can be formulated as
min
Wi,RN
|α|2aH (θ0)
∑K
i=1Wia (θ0)
|α|2aH (θ0)RNa (θ0) + σ2
, ∀i (8a)
s.t. ‖RX −Rd‖2 6 γbp, (8b)
SINRi > γb, ∀i, (8c)
Pt = P0, (8d)
Wi = W
H
i ,Wi  0, ∀i, (8e)
rank (Wi) = 1, ∀i, (8f)
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0, (8g)
where θ0 denotes the location of targets known at the BS,
γbp is a pre-defined threshold that constrains the mismatch
between the designed covariance matrix RX and the desired
Rd. γb denotes the predefined SINR threshold of each legiti-
mate user, and finally rank (·) is rank operator.
B. Minimizing SINRE With Perfect CSI and Target Location
Uncertainty
In this subsection, we consider the case that the target’s
position is roughly known within the angular interval Φ =
[θ0 −∆θ, θ0 +∆θ] due to the uncertainty in the target param-
eter estimation. To guarantee the secrecy rate from transmitter
to legitimate users, the objective function is reformulated to
minimize the sum of target’s SINR at the possible locations
in the angular interval aforementioned. To this end, wider
beam needs to be formulated towards the uncertain interval
to avoid missing the target. Inspired by the 3dB beampattern
design approach in [15], in our problem, we formulate the
beampattern aiming to keep the power equivalent in the
angular interval where the target is estimated to locate at. The
proposed optimization problem can be formulated as
min
Wi,RN
∑
θm∈Φ
|α|2aH (θm)
∑K
i=1Wia (θm)
|α|2aH (θm)RNa (θm) + σ2
, ∀i (9a)
s.t. aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) > γs, (9b)
∀θm ∈ Ω
aH (θk)RXa (θk) 6 (1 + α)a
H (θ0)RXa (θ0) , (9c)
∀θk ∈ Φ
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) 6 aH (θk)RXa (θk) , (9d)
∀θk ∈ Φ
SINRi > γb, ∀i, (9e)
Pt = P0, ∀i, (9f)
Wi = W
H
i , Wi  0, ∀i, (9g)
rank (Wi) = 1, ∀i, (9h)
RN = R
H
N , RN  0, (9i)
where θ0 is the main-beam location, Ω denotes the sidelobe
region of interest, γs is a bound of sidelobe power.
IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Approaches to Problem (8) and (9)
In this section, we propose an iterative algorithm to solve
the above optimization problems. Initially, it is straightforward
to see that (7) is convex, which can be readily solved by use
of standard numerical tools, such as CVX. According to [16],
the problem (8) and (9) presented in section III can be both
regarded as fraction programming (FP) problem. Let us denote
M = |α|2aH (θ0)
∑K
i=1
Wia (θ0) , ∀i,
N = |α|2aH (θ0)RNa (θ0) + σ2
By the above notations, problem (8) can be relaxed in a convex
form as
min
Wi,RN
M−cN,
s.t. ‖RX −Rd‖2 6 γbp,
SINRi > γb, ∀i,
Pt = P0,
Wi = W
H
i ,Wi  0, ∀i,
rank (Wi) = 1, ∀i,
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0,
(10)
To solve the original problem (8), the scaling factor c needs
to be updated in each iteration, yielding
c [t+ 1] =
M [t]
N [t]
, (11)
where t is the index of iteration. To solve (10), SDR technique
can be adopted by omitting the rank-1 constraint. For clarity,
we summarize the above procedure in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Alogrithm for solving FP problem (8)
Input: H, a (θ0), σ
2, α, γb, P0, itermax > 2, γbp.
Output: W
(iter)
i ,R
(iter)
N , i = 1, · · · ,K .
1. Compute Rd. Reformulate problem (8) by (10). Set the
iteration threshold ε > 0. Initialize c(0), c(1),
∣∣c(1) − c(0)∣∣ >
ε.
while iter 6 itermax and
∣∣citer+1 − citer∣∣ > ε do
2. Solve the new convex optimization problem.
3. Update c by (11).
4. Get updated Wi, ∀i, and RN by solving (10) using
SDR.
5. iter = iter + 1.
end while
6. Obtain approximate solutions by eigenvalue decomposi-
tion or Gaussian randomization.
According to [16], it can be easily proven that c is non-
decreasing during the iterations. Consequently, the conver-
gence of Algorithm 1 can be guaranteed.
Following the similar procedure, we denote
A (θm) = |α|2aH (θm)RNa (θm) + σ2
B (θm) = |α|2aH (θm)
∑K
i=1
Wia (θm)
Problem (9) can be rewritten in the form
max
Wi,RN ,y
∑
θm∈Φ
(
2ym
√
A (θm)− y2mB (θm)
)
s.t. aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) > γs, ∀θm ∈ Ω
aH (θk)RXa (θk) 6 (1 + α) a
H (θ0)RXa (θ0) , ∀θk ∈ Φ
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) 6 aH (θk)RXa (θk) , ∀θk ∈ Φ
SINRi > γb, ∀i,
Pt = P0, ∀i,
Wi = W
H
i , Wi  0, ∀i,
rank (Wi) = 1, ∀i,
RN = R
H
N , RN  0.
(12)
Let y denote a collection of variables {y1, · · · , yM}, where
ym is updated iteratively by the following closed form when
θm is fixed
y∗m =
√
A (θm)
B (θm)
. (13)
The problem (12) can be solved again by the SDR technique.
We note that eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian random-
ization is required to obtain an approximate solution. For
clarity, the above procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Alogrithm for solving FP problem (9)
Input: H, a (θ) or a (θm), σ
2, α, γb, P0, itermax > 2, ∆θ.
Output: W
(iter)
i ,R
(iter)
N , i = 1, · · · ,K .
1. Compute Rd. Reformulate problem (9) by (12). Set the
iteration threshold ε > 0.
while iter 6 itermax and
∥∥yiter+1 − yiter∥∥ > ε do
2. Solve the new convex optimization problem.
3. Update y by (13).
4. Get updated Wi, ∀i, and RN by solving (12) using
SDR.
5. iter = iter + 1.
end while
6. Obtain approximate solutions by eigenvalue decomposi-
tion or Gaussian randomization.
B. Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the computational com-
plexity of problem (8) and (9), both of which have been
transformed to SDP problem solved by interior point method
(IPM) [17]. Given ǫ > 0, we obtain an ǫ-optimal solution
after the required number of iterations. In the first optimiza-
tion problem, to generate the ideal beampattern Rd in (7),
which is a typical SDP problem including a linear matrix
inequality (LMI) constraint of size 2N , two LMI constraints
of size N , and an LMI constraint of size 1, so the com-
plexity is O (√4N + 1 (4N6 + 3N5 +N4 +N2) ln (1/ǫ)).
It is notable that problem (8) involves both LMI and second-
order cone (SOC) constraints, which contains 2K + 1 LMI
constraints of size N , K + 1 LMI constraints of size 2N , an
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Fig. 2. Radar beampattern obtained on different circumstances, N =
18, K = 4, γb = 10, P0 = 30dBm.
LMI constraint of size 1 and an SOC constrain of size N .
Accordingly, the complexity of each iteration in (8) can be
given as
O
(√
4KN +K + 2
(
4K3N6 + 4K2N5 +K3N4
)
ln (1/ǫ)
)
+O
(√
4KN +K + 2
(
KN6 +K2N2
)
ln (1/ǫ)
)
+O ((K + 1)N3)
where O ((K + 1)N3) is the complexity of eigenvalue de-
composition1. which represents the complexity of each iter-
ation. For simplicity, the computational complexity can be
commonly given as O (K3.5N6.5 ln (1/ǫ)).
Similarly, in problem (9), we regard both Ω and Φ as
discrete domains which represent a collection of angles region.
This problem involves LMI constraints only. Specifically, it
includes K+1 LMI constraints of size 2N , 2K+2Φ+Ω+1
LMI constraints of size N , an LMI constraints of size 1. The
iteration complexity is
O
(√
N (4K + 2Φ+ Ω+ 3) + 1 ln (1/ǫ)
)
.
Then, per-iteration computation approximately cost
O (K3.5N6.5 ln (1/ǫ)).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results of proposed
methods. For all simulations, we employ a ULA with half-
wavelength spacing between adjacent antennas. The length of
communication frame/radar pulse is set as L = 30. Without
loss of generality, each entry of the channel matrix H is
assumed to obey standard Complex Gaussian distribution, i.e.,
hi,j ∼ CN (0, 1).
We first show in Fig. 2 the obtained radar beampatterns with
precise and uncertain target angles, which are formulated by
solving problem (8) and (9) respectively. We set ∆θ = 5◦ and
1We adopt eigenvalue decomposition method to get the approximate result
because of the high complexity of Gaussian randomization.
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∆θ = 10◦ when the target location is known roughly, which
represented by dashed.For the case of precise target angle, it is
noted that a narrow beam is formulated towards the direction
of interest. For the cases with uncertain target angles, on the
other hand, the mainbeam power decreases with the angle of
location uncertainty being broadened, which demonstrates the
tradeoff between the power of beampattern pointing to the
target location and the precision of target location known at
transmitter.
The convergence of SINR at eavesdropper is demonstrated
in Fig.3. It is obvious that both Algorithm 1 and 2 converge
to the optimum within a modest number of iterations.
The secrecy rate of the legitimate communication link in
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy rate versus the threshold of sidelobe power with
different SINR threshold at legitimate users, N = 18, K = 4, P0 = 30dBm.
terms of a rising SINR threshold γb is shown in Fig. 4, with
γbp = 60, γs = 10
4. It can be observed that the secrecy rate
increases with the growth of the SINR threshold at legitimate
users. It is noteworthy that the secrecy rate for the case with
precisely known target location is higher than that of the case
with uncertain target location. Additionally, the secrecy rate
reduces with the descending tendency of the power budget.
Finally, Fig. 5 represents the secrecy rate performance
versus the given threshold of sidelobe γs, with P0 =
30dBm,∆θ = 5◦, and the SINR threshold at users is given as
γb = 10dB and γb = 20dB respectively. It is notable that the
secrecy rate decreases with the increasing of γs. It is notable
that the decreasing tendency of secrecy rate gets obvious when
γs is greater than 30dB.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the AN-aided method to ensure the
physical layer security in DFRC system. It is assumed that
the communication CSI is perfectly known while the tar-
get location might be inaccurately estimated. To guarantee
communication secrecy while detecting targets (which are
potential eavesdroppers), we have minimized the SINR at the
targets by formulating FP optimization problems, which can
be equivalently recast as a series of sub-problems with convex
objective functions. By dropping the rank-1 constraint, each
sub-problem can be relaxed as an SDP, and can be thus solved
by numerical tools. Numerical results have been provided to
verify the effectiveness of the proposed approaches, which
show that it it is feasible to guarantee both the performance
of the radar beampattern and the communication secrecy by
the proposed optimization based designs.
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